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The FOMC in 1986: Flexible Policy
for Uncertain limes
Philip A. Nuetzel
HE Federal Reserve’s monetary policy actions
during 1986 were influenced by indications of weak
economic growth and moderate inflation. The income
velocityof money, defined as the ratio ofnominal GNP
to the narrowly defined money supply Ml, declined
even more rapidly in 1986 than it had in the previous
year.’ lnterest rates declined on balance over 1986, and
the Federal Open Market Committee (het-eafter “Com-
mittee” or “FOMC”) viewedtheir decline and the asso-
ciated rapid growth of Ml as a desirable development
in light of the sluggish economy. As the year pro-
gressed, the Committee deemphasized Ml as a guide
to policy while focusing on the broader monetary
aggregates, M2 and M3, and several indicators of eco-
nomic and financial conditions. In the uncertain eco-
nomic environment that prevailed in 1986, the Com-
rnittee was flexible in its approach to monetary policy.
This article reviews the FOMC’s monetar policy
decisions during 1986. The Committee’s annual
growth objectives for the monetary aggregates are
discussed in the next section, and the target ranges for
1986 are compared with actual money growth during
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NOTE: Citations referred to as“Record” are to the “Record of Policy
Actions of the Federal Open Market Committee” found in various
issues of the Federal Reserve Bulletin. Citations referred to as “Re-
port” are to the “Monetary Policy Report to Congress,” also found in
various issues of the Federal Reserve Bulletin.
‘Ml growth from fV/1 985 tolV/1986 was 15.3 percent, up from 12.1
percent over the preceding four quarters. Over the same two peri-
ods, nominal GNP grew at rates of 4.2 percent and 6.3 percent,
respectively.
theyear. Then, the Committee’s views concerning the
rapid growth of Ml are considet-ed in more detail, and
other variables that had a significant influence on
policy are discussed. Finally, the short-run directives
issued by the FOMC during 1986 arereviewed chrono-
logically.
ANNUAL TARGETS FOR 1986
Each February, the Board of Governors appeals be-
fore Congress to report on the annual growth targets
that the FOMC has established for the monetary and
credit aggregates for the coming year. In July, the
Board reports on the progress made towai-d meeting
these goals and announces the FOMC’s provisional
growth targets for the following calendar year.2 The
Committee states its annual targets in tenns of growth
ranges from the fourth quarter ofthe previous year to
the fourth quarter of the current year.’ The dates of the
three meetings at which the annual target ranges for
1986 were considered are listed in table 1 along with
the ranges established for Ml, M2 and M3, and the
actual growth rates of these aggregates during 1986.
‘These reports are required under the Full Employment and Bal-
anced Growth Act of 1978, also known as the Humphrey-Hawkins
Act.
‘The Committee’s use of the fourth quarter of the previous year as
the base period for establishing the current year’s growth targets
leads to an upward drift in money growth if the growth of an
aggregate during the previous year exceeded the target range for
that year. The “base drift” problem is discussed by Broaddus and
Goodfriend (1984). For a viewpoint that favorsbase drift, see Walsh
(1986).
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July 1985 Meeting
The tentative ranges for 1986 established at the July
1985 FOMC meeting reflected the Committee’s feeling,
at that time, that continuation of the rapid money
growth in the first half of 1985 might be inconsistent
with sustainable economic expansion and reasonable
price stability. The tentative 1986 range for Ml of4 to 7
percent was 2 percentage points narrower than the 3
to 8 percent rebased range adopted in July 1985 for the
II/1985—1V/1985period;’ the upper limit ofthetentative
M3 range of 6 to 9 percent was one-half percentage
point lower than the upper limit of its 1985 range.
The growth of the three monetary aggregates
slowed somewhat during the second half of 1985. Ml
growth exceeded the upper limit of its rebased range,
however, and its velocity declined even more sharply
than it had during the first half.
February 1986 Meeting
The annual growth ranges for 1986 were reconsid-
ered at the Committee’s meeting on February 11—12,
1986. For Ml growth, the Committee chose a target
range of 3 to 8 percent, which was based on expecta-
tions that Ml growth would slow while nominal GNP
growth would accelerate. This range was 2percentage
points wider than the FOMC had tentatively planned,
reflecting continuing uncertainty about the future be-
havior of Ml and its velocity. The Board’s report to
Congress stated that:
Thewidth ofthe Ml range reflects continuing uncer-
tainty about the behavior’ of Ml under varying eco-
nomic and financial circumstances.,., While the
rangeforMl is wide enough to allow for somevariation
in behavior of the aggregate’s income velocit in re-
sponse to changing conditions, the range was set on
the assumption that therewould not he alargedrop in
velocity, such as occurred in 1985. tn that connection,
the Committee will evaluate behavior of Ml in light of
its consistency with other monetaty aggregates, eco-
nomic and financial developments, and the potential
for inflationary pressures.’
The 6 to 9 percent ranges for M2and M3 established
tentatively in July were affirmed by the Committee at
~Because oftheapparentdecline in Ml velocity during the first halfof
1985, the FOMC decided in July 1985 that the annual range origi-
nally established for Ml growth was undesirable. The Committee
voted to move the base period of that range from IV/1984 to lI/I 985.
See Hafer (1986) for a discussion of the decision to rebase the Ml
range and the influence that declining Ml velocity had on the
FOMC’s decisions in general during 1985.
‘Report (April1986), p. 214.
A
/
... ,- -~ ,.,~ ~,At
the February meeting. The growth of these broadet-
aggregates had been within their target ranges in 1985,
andit wasobserved that ‘onbalance overthe past few
years, the behavior of M2and M3 seemed to have been
less affected by institutional and interest rate
changes.”
July 1986 Meeting
Overthefirst halfof1986, the growth rates ofM2 and
M3 were roughly in the middle of their target ranges.
Ml growth slowed in the first quarter from its pace in
1985, but accelerated sharply in the second quarter,
leaving its annualized growth rate from December
through June at 13.3 percent, more than S percentage
points above the upper bound of the Committee’s
target range for the year. Other evidence reviewed by
the Committee at the meeting of July 8—9. 1986, sug-
gested that the rate of economic growth had slowed
considerably in the second quarter from the 2.9 per-
cent growth ofreal GNP registered in 1/1986.’ Further-
‘Record (June 1986), p. 410. The Committee alsoadopted a moni-
toring range forthegrowth oftotal domestic nonfinancial debt of 8 to
11 percent.
‘Revisions showed that real GNP grew at a rate of 3.8 percent in
/1986 and 0.6 percent in Il/i 986. All of the data used in the text in
discussing the Committee’s deliberations are those that were avail-
able to the Committee at the time.
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more, wage and price increases continued to moder-
ate overthe first halfof the year, even when the direct
effects of declines in food and energy prices were
eliminated.
The Committee reaffirmed the long-run growth
ranges of 6 to 9 percent for M2 and M3. In their
discussion of the range for Ml growth, however, the
members again emphasized uncertainties affecting
the outlook for Ml velocity and the changes in Ml’s
composition resulting from the rapid growth of its
deregulated, interest-bearing component. Interest
rates had declined by 1 to 2 percentage points during
the first half and were thought to be associated with
the rapid growth of Ml. Some members thought that
the Ml range should be eliminated, “at least pending
the reestablishment of a more predictable relation-
ship with overall measures of economic activity.” A
majority, however, preferred to retain a range for Ml
“even though they believed its operational signifi-
cance could only be judged in the perspective of
concurrent economic and financial developments, in-
cluding the behavior of M2 and M3.” Rather than
raising or rebasing theexisting Ml range, the Commit-
tee acknowledged its desire to accommodate uncer-
tain changes in Ml demand by agreeing that, after
accounting for the behavior of the broader aggregates
and other developments, including trends in interest
rates, growth of Ml in excess of 8 percent would be
acceptable for 1986.
ActualMoney Growth in 1986
The actual growth rates of the monetary aggregates
for 1986 are reported at the bottom of table 1. Ml
growth of 15.3 percent was 7.3 percentage points
above the upper’ bound of its range set early in the
year. This growth rate represents a significant acceler-
ation from the already rapid 12.1 percent growth of Ml
from IV/1984 to lV/1985. In comparison, Ml’s average
annual growth rate over the 1960—84 period was only
5.8 percent.
One reason why the Committee accepted the rapid
Ml growth during 1986 was that the growth rates of
M2 and M3 were quite close to the 9 percent upper
limit of their target ranges for the year. M2 growth of
8.9 percent and M3 growth of8.7 percent were slightly
more rapid than their respective growth rates of 8.7
‘Record (October 1986), p. 708.
‘Ibid.
percent and 7.7 percent over the IV/1984—IV/1985 pe-
riod. The Committee felt, however, that thebehavior of
these aggregates was generally consistent with its
overall policy objectives. The Board’s mid-year report
to Congress stated that “during a period of greater
overallprice stability and adequate capacity relative to
the demands placed upon it,” monetary policy had
been able “to accommodate demands for money and
credit, helping facilitate further declines in interest
rates....”
THE FOMC’s GUIDES FOR POLICY
IMPLEMENTATION
The Committee’s use of avariable as a policy guide
is based on assumptions about the effect of that vari-
ableon real economic growth and the rate ofinflation,
which are ofultimate concern, as well as the ability of
policy actions to influence that variable. As noted
previously, the deemphasis of Ml as a policy guide
was areaction to the instability of Ml velocity. In this
section, we review the Committee’s explanation for
the unusually rapid growth of Ml relative to nominal
GNP and its reasons for believing that the relationship
between Ml and economic activity would be subject
to ahigh degree ofuncertainty forsome time. We then
discuss the Committee’s reasons forcontinuing to use
other variables as policy guides, such as M2 and M3,
thelevel of interest rates, theforeign exchange value of
the dollar, real GNP and indicators of output and
prices -
Institutional Changes and Ml
In accounting forthe rapid growth of Ml in 1986, the
Committee emphasized that the composition of Ml
had changed in part because of the deregulation of
deposit interest rates and minimum balance require-
ments that had taken place under the Monetary Con-
tr-ol Act of 1980 and the Cam-St. Germain Act of 1982.”
From 1980 to 1985, for’ example, the proportion of
intel-est-beanng checkable deposits (other checkable
deposits, or OCDsI in Ml rose from 5.5 percent to 27.6
percent, atrend that continued in 1986.
Table 2 shows the annualized growth rates of Ml
and its three major components for each quarter of
“Report (September 1986), p. 603.
“For a discussion of federal policy on deposit interest rateceilings, or
Regulation 0, and the phaseout of deposit regulation, see Gilbert
(1986).
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The Committee attributed much of the rapid
growth of OCFJs and demand deposits, and hence
declining Ml velocity in 1936, to declining interest
rates and subsiding inflationary expectations. In the
midyear report to Congress, the Board stressed that
“the advent and expansion of interest-bearing check-
ing accounts over the years have attracted more
savings-type balances and haveincreased the respon-
siveness of Ml to interest rate changes,~”Comment-
ing on the rapid growth of demand deposits~Chair-
man Paul Voicker said that there were “some
indications of a greater- willingness of businesses to
hold demand deposits atatime of lower interest rates,
partly because, with interest rates down, a larger bal-
ance is necessary to compensate banks for’ a given
amount of services,”
Chart 1 shows the paths of selected short-term
~2Report (September 1986). p. 614. Support for the view that the
interest elasticity of money demand has increased with deposit
deregulation can be found in Keeley and Zimmerman (1986), Roth
(1985), Mehra (1985) and Wenninger (1986).
“Volcker (1986), p.640.
interest rates and thegrowth of Ml over1985 and 1986.
There were major accelerations in Ml growth accom-
panied by declining short-term rates during the
spring of 1985, the late winter and spring of 1986, and
the summer of 1986. On the other hand, there were
also accelerations of Ml growth during periods of
r’elatively stable interest rates in the summer and the
latefall of 1985, and the fall of 1986. The consensus at
the Committee’s meeting in July 1986 was that rapid
Ml growth during the first half of the year reflected
lagged adjustments to declining inflationary expecta-
tions and interest rates; it did not seem to hold the
usual potential for reigniting inflationary pressures
when judged in the context of other developments,
including more restrained growth of the broader
aggregates.”
While the Committee thought that Ml still had
some informational value, it did not wish to restrain
the process of adjustment that it feltwas responsible
for rapid Ml growth and declining velocity. Chairman
Volckerstated in July 1986 that “. -. a firm conclusion
concerning the nature and stability of future velocity
characteristics may take years of experience in the
new institutional and economic setting.” The Chair-
man went on to summarize the Committee’s attitude
toward the use of Ml as a policy tool:
“See the Record (October 1986), p. 708.
“Voloker(1986), p. 641.
1986 and for- the year as awhole. The OCDcomponent
ofMl grewat 28.6 percent, 6.4percentage points faster
than its 1985 growth rate. Gr-owth in demand deposits
was also quite rapid, accelerating from 8.9 percent in
1985 to 11.6 percent in 1986. Growth of the public’s
currency holdings was unchanged at 7.5 percent.
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Chort 1
Short4erm ~nterest Rates and Ml Growth
Ml growth rotes ore compounded onnuol rotes of chonge of four-week moving overoges of Ml from four weeks previous.
Experience over’ the fir-st halfof 1986 underscored the
difficulty — Iwould say impossibility — ofconducting
monetary policy in current circumstances according
to one or two simple, preset criteria .,. the weight of
the evidence strongly suggests that Ml a/one dur’ing
this per-iod ofeconomic and institutional transition is
not todaya reliable measur-e of future price pressures
or indeed a good short-term “leading indicator” of
business acuvityl.The more restr-ainedperformance of
the hr’oadem’ aggregates, as well as rhe performance of
the economy and prices themselves, point in a differ-
ent direction.”
M2and M3
In recent years, the velocity behavior- of M2 and M3
“Ibid., p. 642.
have not changed as radically as M1’s.Apparentlv, the
shifts in asset holdings resulting from the combina-
tion of falling interest rates and deposit deregulation
have occurr-ed largely within the broader aggregates
and have not ledto as large a surge in their growth as
in Ml’s.
The FOMC has responded by assigning more weight
to M2 and M3 as policy guides.” In 1986, the Commit-
“Monetary policy actions have a weaker influence on the broader
aggregates than on Ml, however, because most of the non-Mi
deposit liabilities included in M2 and M3 are not subject to reserve
requirements. Moreover, information on these aggregates is avail-
able at a longer lag. See Lawler (1981). Also, Hater (1981) presents
empirical evidence suggesting that M2 is less controllable through
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tee often evaluated potential changes in policy on the
basis of the recent growth of these aggregates, among
other factors. For example, in April, the Committee
viewed the growth of M2 and M3 at rates within their’
target ranges as evidence that the rapid growth of Ml
did not represent an excessive buildup ofliquidity.” At
later meetings. when M2and M3 were near the upper
limits of their ranges, members expressed mor’e con-
cern about the implications of accommodative policy
for inflation.”
Interest Rates
The Committee also evaluated potential changes in
its policy stance during 1986 in the context of recent
movements in interest rates. By implementing an ac-
commodative policy in 1986, the Committee sought to
provide the reserves necessary to support increases in
money demand.” At two meetings, though it felt that
“Seethe Record (September 1986), pp. 649—50.
“See the following Records: November 1986, pp. 784—85; January
1987, pp. 34—35; February 1987, pp. 120—21.
“See Report (September 1986), pp. 612—1 3.
less restrictive reserve conditions were desirable, the
Committee contemplated that the easing would be
achieved through discount rate reductions by the
Board. This was expected to facilitate a market ten-
dencv toward lower interest rates.” Moreover, the
appropriateness of potential intermeeting adjust-
ments in the provision of reserves were viewed as
conditional on near-term changes in rates, including
potential discount rate reductions.
While it sought to promote easier- credit market
conditions, the Committee also took account ofmove-
ments in long-term interest rates as indicators of
changes in inflationary expectations. For example, an
increase in interest rates before the September meet-
ing, together with some other developments, was in-
terpr-eted asasign ofan increase in expected inflation.
This was one factor that led to avote for “maintaining
unchanged conditions ofreserve availability,” andone
“See the following Records: October 1986, p. no; November 1986,
p. 784. The same point is discussed in Record (June 1986), pp.
411—12.
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member believed that less ease in policy implementa-
tion was desirable at that time?’
International Developments
Concerns about the external sector-also influenced
the FOMC’s policy actions in 1986. The foreign ex-
change value of the dollar had declined substantially
on atrade-weighted basis since early1985. Asaresult,
the trade deficit was expected to decline during 1986,
hut it widened instead and was a continuing element
of uncertainty in the economic outlook. Throughout
the year’. the Committee expressed doubts about the
timing and magnitude of any improvement in the
tr’ade balance because it believed that foreign pro-
ducers would attempt to maintaln their U.S. market
shares byreducing their’ profitmargins.” The Commit-
tee also feltthat increases in U.S.net exports would be
hindered by sluggish growth in the economies of
some major U.S. trading partners in the absence of
most stimulative policies abroad?
While the falling dollar-improved the prospects for a
smaller trade deficit, Committee members noted that
it also had a potential inflationary impact.” Further-
more, the trade deficit implied large capital inflows
from abroad that were financing domestic economic
activity, toss of confidence in the dollar might require
sharp increases in domestic interest rates to maintain
the inflow offoreign capi.tal:members of the Commit-
tee often mentioned this risk to economic expansion.”
In general, the Committee felt that greater caution
should be exercised in providing reserves in the event
of sharp dollar depreciation during inter-meeting
periods.”
“See the Record (January 1987), p. 34.
“Mann (1986) presents evidence in support of this view. See Report
(April 1986), p. 216, Report (September 1986), p. 610, and the
following Records: June 1986, p. 409; July 1986, p. 480; January
1987, p. 33.
“See Report (September 1986), pp. 604—05 and p. 610, and the
following Records: July 1986, pp. 480—81; October 1986, p. 707;
January 1987, p. 33. Also see the Record in Press Release, Federal
Reserve Board ot Governors. February 13, 1987, p.7. There were,
in fact, limited moves roward expansionary policies in some major
industrial nations during the year, including coordinated rounds of
discount rate reductions with the Federal Reserve,
“See the following Records: June 1986, p. 409; November 1986, pp.
783—84; January 1987, pP. 33—34; February 1987, p. 120.
“See the following Records:June1986, p.41 2;October1986, p.7lO;
November 1986, p. 784. Also, see Report (September 1986), p.
641, for a brief discussion of the risks of sharp depreciation of the
dollar on foreign exchange markets, and howthose risks influenced
the Board’s decisions on discount rate reductions.
“See the following Records: June 1986, p.41 2;October1986, p.710;
November 1986. pp. 784—85; January 1987, p.35; Press Release,
February 13, 1987, p. 11,
RealActivity and Prices
Finally, the FOMC’s decisions in 1986 were guided
by available data on production, employment, wages
and prices, and projections ofeconomic activity based
on recent developments. Consumer prices rose by
only 1.1 percent in 1986, thelowest rate of inflation by
this measure since 1965. Steep declines in oil prices
earl in the year contributed to the low rate of in-
flation, hut wage and price pressures were otherwise
quite moderate. Monthly data on production and em-
ployment and the growth of real GNP indicated, over-
much ofthe year, that the expansion was proceeding
at aslowerpace than the Committee had anticipated?
Throughout the year, the members generally antici-
pated more rapid real growth and inflation in later
quarters. Nevertheless, current indications of sluggish
growth, moderate price pressures and downside risks
in the economic outlook weighed heavily in the Com-
mittee’s decisions to maintain the accommodative
stance of policy.”The Committee’s views on the desir-
ability of inter-meeting adjustments in policy imple-
mentation also depended upon indications of the
pace of economic growth and inflation, among other
developments.”
SHORT-RUN POLICY OBJECTIVES
The FOMC meets eight times each year to review
economic developments and discuss the status of
policy and its implementation. At each meeting, the
Committee’s decisions are summarized in a directive
isstred to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. The
directive is then used b the Manager for Domestic
Operations, System Open Market Account, to guide
the day-to-day implementation of monetary policy
thr’ough open-market operations during the inter-
meeting period.
Recent policy directives speci~’the Committee’s
decision aboutthe appropriate “degree ofpressure on
reserve positions” of depository institutions for the
“RealGNP grew 2.1 percent over the IV/1985—lV/1986 period. At the
February 1986 meeting, the forecasts of real GNP growth of the
members of the Committee and Federal Reserve Bank presidents
had a central tendencyof 3 to 3’/2 percent. See the Record (June
1986). p,408. At the July 1986 meeting, the forecasts for the year
had a central tendencyof2’/~ to S percent. See the Record (October
1985), p. 706.
“For example, see the following Records: -June 1986, p.411; Sep-
tember 1986, p. 650; October 1986, p.710.
“For example, see the following Records: June 1986, p. 412; July
1986, p. 482; September 1986, p. 650; February 1987, pp.120—21;
Press Release, February 13,1987, p.11.
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each meeting and the degree ofpressure to be applied
to reserve positions.
February Meeting
The economic data reviewed at the February meet-
ing indicated amoderate and, perhaps, improving rate
of economic growth. Real GNP grew at an annual rate
of 2.4 percent in 1V/1985, which was slower than its 3
percent growth in theprevious quarter. Severalindica-
tors of real activity, however, such as industrial pro-
duction, housing starts and new orders for nonde-
fense capital goods had shown strength in December
after performing sluggishly in prior months. Moreover,
substantial gains in employment were reported for
January.
The Committee discussed a number of uncertain-
tiesthat clouded the outlook at theFebruary meeting.
The sharp decline in oil prices in early 1986 was
expected to havebroadly favorable effects on theecon-
omy. These effects were difficult to assess, however,
and energy-producing regions of the country and
some oil-producing, developing countries with large
debt burdens were likely to suffer. While prospective
fiscal restraint associated with deficit reduction under
the Gramm-Rudman-Flollings legislation was thought
to have hadabeneficial impact on financial markets, it
was expected to have adverse effects on aggregate
demand. Some members expressed concern overthe
strength of business investment in light of the uncer-
tainties surrounding tax reform legislation, which was
likely to tilt the composition of tax liabilities toward
businesses and away from households.
Despite these considerations, members generally
agreed that the economy was likely to grow at afaster
rate during 1986 than it had in 1985. Some of the
positive factors cited were the effects of rapid Ml
growth, lower inter’est rates, higher stock prices and
further declines in the foreign exchange value of the
dollar. In fact, some members felt that inflationary
pressures might crop up sever-al quarters ahead.
The growth ofMl and MS had slowed in theweeks
prior to the February meeting, and money growth was
close to therate expected by theCommittee in Decem-
ber for the November-to-March period. While that fact
was encouraging, some members were concerned
about the failure ofshort-term interest rates to decline
further in recent months in response to the relatively
accommodative stance of monetary policy that had
prevailed forsome time. There was gener-al accord on
the desirability of implementing policy “in a manner
that would not in itself signal or encourage higher
interest rates orimpede the tendency forsome market
rates to decline.”” There was, however, a perceived
riskof “a cumulating decline in the exchange rate that
might discourage willingness to hold dollars at declin-
ing interest rates. In these circumstances, nearly all
participants agreed that little or no change in reserve
availability was warranted.”
The Committee viewed its policy stance as accom-
modative, but some members felt that further easing
might be necessary in light ofthe risks ofa weakening
economy. In fact, “the point was made that the dis-
count rate might need to be reduced to permit or
accommodate a market tendency toward lower inter-
est rates and that such a move would be a desirable
complement to open market operations...”” On the
other hand, members felt that the desirability of a
reduction in the discount rate would depend on
evolving circumstances and the prospects for- similar
action by major foreign central banks?
April Meeting
Interest rates of all maturities declined during the
period between the February and April meetings, with
long-term rates falling more sharply than short-term
rates. The foreign exchange value of the dollar also
declined on balance. At the time of the April meeting,
however, there were conflicting signals about thepace
of economic activity. Spending and real output were
thought to have grown more rapidly during the first
quartem- than in the sluggish fourth quarter.” On the
other hand, growth was clearly weak in some key
sectors, and production and employment data for
February were disappointing. On the bright side, de-
clines in oil prices dominated the inflation outlook,
and were viewed as instrumental in lowering in-
flationary expectations.
‘I’he Committee decided to maintain “about the
existing degree of pm-essure on reserve conditions~.”~
This was felt to he c:onsistent with the long-run objec-
“Record (June 1986), pp. 411—12.
“Ibid., p. 411.
“Ibid.
“The Federal Reserve announced a reduction of the discount rate
from 71/2 to 7 percent on March 7. Subsequently, this action was
matched by several foreign central banks.
“The Commerce Department had reported a downward revision in
real GNP growth in IV/1 985 to 0.7 percent.
“Record (July 1986), p. 482.
24FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS FEBRUARY 1987
tives for growth in the monetary aggregates - ‘rhe
growth ofMl had accelerated in February and March,
and was near the upper end of the Committee’s an-
nual range, but the growth of the broader aggregates
had been moderate. The Committee discussed the
possibility that demands for Ml balances could grow
substantially if inter-est rates continued to decline.
Furthermore, the velocity of Ml remained weak, and
somemembers suggested that amore accommodative
posture with respect to money and reserve gr-owth
might well become desirable. For the weeks immedi-
ately ahead, however, “most of the members felt that
there should be no presumptions about the likely
direction of any intermeeting adjustments.”’
The Board announced another reduction in the
discount rate of one-half point, to 6’/z percent, effec-
tive April21. The Committee held a telephone confei-
ence on that date and agreed to make no changes in
the current directive. Recent data indicated that
growth in the monetary aggregates had accelerated,
however, and the members felt that, in implementing
open market operations, “a degree of caution should
be exercised to avoid an impression that a further
change in the discount rate was sought over the pe-
riod immediately ahead.”
MayMeeting
‘rhe acceleration in the growth of Ml continued,
and the appropriateness of using that aggregate as a
guide to policywas prominent in the discussion at the
Committee’s meeting on May 20. As of early May, Ml
was well above the 8 percent upper limit of its target
range for 1986. Some members noted that the rela-
tively rapid growth of Ml balances needed to he ac-
commodated in light ofthecontinuing adjustments to
earlierdeclines in inflationary expectations andinter-
est rates and some indications of weakness in the
economy.”
Other members suggested that the rapid money
growth might represent excessive growth in liquidity
that eventuallywould have inflationary consequences.
In this view, rapidly growing cash balances “were
available to support a considei-able pickup in spend-
“Ibid.
“Ibid., p. 483.
“The Commerce Department’s preliminary estimate of real GNP
growth in the firstquarter was 3.7 percent, but industrial production
declined on balance over the three months ending in April. More-
over, weakness among oil producers and uncertain but potentially
adverse changes in the tax code were retarding business fixed
investment.
ing at some point in the future.” The growth of the
broader aggregates had been well within their respec-
tive target ranges for 1986, howevemA which “raised
questions as to whether- the growth of Ml i-eallyrepre-
sented a potentially excessive buildup in liquidity or
was more of a shift in the composition of liquid hold-
ings in response to relative movements in interest
rates.’” The members generally agreed that some
slowing in Ml growth was likely in the weeks ahead,
but, because of uncertainties about the timing and
extent of the slowdown, ‘some proposed omitting
numerical references in the directive to the Commit-
tee’s expectations for monetary growth in the second
quarter.”’ This pi-oposal was rejected by the majority.
While some evidence of slower real gr-owth had
emerged by the time of the May meeting, a number- of
factors pointed toward more rapid growth later in the
year. These factors included rapid money growth,
higher prices of financial assets, lower energy prices
and further depreciation of the dollar against the
currencies of major- trading partners. In response to
these elements in the outlook, ‘most of the members
indicated that they were in favor of continuing to
direct open market operations at least initially toward
maintaining the existing degree of reserve availabil-
ity.”~In their discussion of possible intermeeting ad-
justments, most members emphasized a potential
need for restraint in response to signals of astrength-
ening economy if growth in the monetary aggregates
did not slow as anticipated. The directive stated that,
under those circumstances, “somewhat greater re-
serve restraint would be acceptable,” hut in the event
of slower money growth and sluggish economic activ-
ity, “somewhat lesser reserve restraint might he ac-
ceptable.”’
July Meeting
Some optimism was expressed at the July meeting
about the pi-ospects for economic growth over the
second half, arid the outlook for inflation remained
favorable. Ther’e was concern, however, about the




“Ibid.. pp. 651—52. In response to rapid growth in required reserves
and currency in circulation, the limit on changes in System Account
holdings of U.S. government and federal agency securities between
Committee meetings was temporarily raised by the Committee from
$3 billion to $9 billion on June 18.
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sluggish pace of business investment, the lack of im-
provement in the trade balance, and the “sharp con-
trasts in the economic performance of different sec-
tors and regions of the country and -- - strains on
financial institutions that serviced the depressed
industries.”’
At the previous meeting, the members had antici-
pated that a move toward restraint might be neces-
sary. By July, the favorable inflation outlook and con-
cern over slow economic growth led most of the
members to believe “that some easing was desirable,”
which they preferred to implement “at least initially,
through a lower discount rate rather than through
open market operations.” The members accepted a
directive “that called forsome decrease in the existing
degree of reservepressure, recognizing that relaxation
could be accomplished in the first instance by a re-
duction in the discount rate.”’
The Committee continued toanticipate aslowdown
inthe growth ofMl, which had decelerated somewhat
inJune butwas still quite rapid (see chart 1).Consider-
able doubt remained about the extent and timing of
such a slowdown, however. With the growth of the
broader aggregates around the midpoints of their
ranges for the year, and in the context of an unex-
pectedly sluggish economy, the Committee members
agreed that rigid adherence to the original Ml target
was inconsistent with their objectives. Because of
their uncertainty about theusefulness ofMl as aguide
to policy under prevailing conditions, “a majority of
the members expressed a preference for not indica-
ting a specific rate of expected growth for Ml in the
short-mn operational paragraph of the Committee’s
directive.”
August Meeting
The rapid growth ofMl continued through July and
into early August. The broader aggregates also grew
“Record (October 1986), p. 707.
“Ibid., p. 710. Ofcourse, a cut in the discount rate should increase the
demandfor borrowed reserves bydepository institutions. Underthe
borrowed reserve operating procedure currently used by the open-
marketdesk, this would result in open-market purchases of securi-
ties unless the borrowed reserves target is increased. See Gilbert
(1985) for a discussion of thecurrent operating procedure and two
others that have been used by the open-market desk since 1970.
The borrowed reserves targets used by the desk during each year
are published during the following year in the Federal ReserveBank
of New York Quarterfr Review.
“Record (October 1986), p. 710. On July 10, the Federal Reserve
announced a ‘/2-point reduction in the discount rate to 6 percent.
“Ibid.
quite rapidly, leaving them near the upper limits of
their target ranges. At the Committee’s August meet-
ing, there was some concern about whether the rapid
growth in all three aggregates had inflationary impli-
cations. Moreover, there had been further deprecia-
tion in theforeign exchange value of the dollar during
the intermeeting period. The cheaper dollar was ex-
pected to put some upward pressure on prices, even
though there were not yet any signs of the long-
awaited reduction in the trade deficit. There wassome
evidence that economic growth was accelerating from
the weak pace of the second quarter, including strong
consumption demand and housing activity.” Never-
theless, thedatareviewed atthis meeting continued to
indicate a lack of balance in terms of growth among
different sectors of the economy and only moderate
wage and price pressures. In view of the fact that
interest rates had resumed their decline since early
June,the members agreed that money growth had not
been excessive.
Themembers considered anumber ofuncertainties
that continued to cloud the economic outlook in Au-
gust. These included downside risks related to the
effects of tax reform legislation, rising consumer debt
burdens and sluggish growth of the economies of
several major U.S. trading partners. There was also
uncertainty about the course of the federal budget
deficit and its impact on the economy.
The Committee agreed that “some slight easing in
the degree of r-esen’e pressure” was appropriate, and
once again stated that this “might be accomplished
through areduction in the discount rate.” The mem-
bers felt that an intermeeting adjustment in either the
direction of ease or r-estraint might be warranted,
depending on ensuing developments. It was noted,
however, that in the event of a further cut in the
discount rate, a significant depreciation ofthe dollar
on foreign exchange markets would call for “a little
greater caution in the provision of reserves through
open market operations “The Board reduced the
discount rate by ‘/z percentage point to 5’/z percent
effective August 21.
September Meeting
Short-term interest rates fell somewhat after the
reduction in the discount rate, but long-term rates
“The preliminary estimate of real GNP growth in 11/1986 was 1.1
percent.
“Record (November1986), p. 785.
“Ibid.
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rose sharply, and by the time of the Committee’s
meeting on September 23, the value of the dollar on
foreign exchange markets had changed little. The
growth rates ofM2 and M3 decelerated in August but
were still fairly rapid, and Ml growth accelerated from
its already rapid pace before slowing sharply in early
September.
Most Committee members believed that, despite an
apparently stronger economy in the third quarter, an
improvement in the trade balance was critical to sus-
tained growth.At the same time, the members felt that
there were compelling reasons for expecting some
upward price pressures in the quarters ahead, includ-
ing the likelihood of price increases for imports and
import-competing goods stemming from the decline
of the dollar, and a continuing reversal of the earlier
decline in world oil prices. In addition, there had been
indications of a resurgence of inflationary expecta-
tions in financial markets and in markets for precious
metals. Because “monetary policy had moved toward
an increasingly accommodative posture over the
course of recent months,” several members believed
“that it was now time to pause and observe develop-
ments “ The Committee voted for “no change in
the current degree ofpressure on reserve positions.”’
In fact, while not ruling out the possibility ofa move
toward ease, most of the members believed that any
potential intermeeting adjustment would more likely
involve some restraint, depending on the behavior ofa
number of guides reflecting economic and financial
conditions.
November Meeting
The Committee’s expectation that money growth
would fall somewhat from its exceptionally rapid pace
during the summer months was fulfilled in September
and October: M2 and M3 advanced at annual rates of
9.3 and 8percent over the twomonths, and Ml growth
slowed to arate of12.5 percent. Meanwhile, economic
activity appeared to be growing at amoderate rate.”
At the Committee’s November meeting, the mem-
bers saw a continuation in the moderate pace of
economic expansion as a likely outcome, but certain
aspects of the outlook were disturbing. Improvement
“Record (January 1987), p. 34.
“Ibid., p. 35.
“Real GNP grew at an annual rate of 2.4 percent in 111/1986, accord-
ing to the preliminary estimate, after growth of only 0.6 percent in
Il/i 986.
“Record (February 1987), p. 120.
in the trade balance remained elusive and, in large
part, dependent upon stronger economic growth
overseas to spur demands forU.S. exports. One mem-
ber referred to increasing protectionist sentiment as a
threat to real growth and price stability. In addition,
tax reform legislation appeared to be deterring busi-
ness investment, particularly in structures.
The Committee expected inflation to accelerate
somewhat over the quarters ahead because of the
lagged impacts of thedollar’s depreciation and energy
price developments. Onthe other hand, relatively low
rates of capacity utilization in most industries, moder-
ate wage growth and continuing efforts by businesses
to reduce costs and improve productivity were factors
that would help to hold inflation in check. Moreover,
the value of the dollar on foreign exchange markets
had stabilized during the intermeeting period. Ifcon-
tinued, that stability would limit a potential source of
upward price pressure.
Given the prospects forsustained, moderate growth
in economic activity and recent moderation in the
growth of the monetary aggregates, the Committee
voted for “maintaining unchanged conditions of re-
serve availability.”’ With regard to possible intermeet-
ing adjustments, some members felt that an easing
might be desirable in the context of indications of
weakness in the economy, while others felt that
money growth below the Committee’s expectations
should be tolerated in the absence of rising interest
rates or a weakeconomy. The directive did not incor-
porate any presumption, however, about the likely
direction of any intermeeting adjustment in policy.”
December Meeting
The data reviewed at the Committee’s December
meeting showed that employment growth, industrial
production and consumer spending had strength-
ened in recent months. Sluggishness in business
spending and the housing sector were elements of
concern, however, and thebalance oftrade showed no
convincing signs of improvement. To a considerable
extent, the discussion focused on downside risks to
economic growth, particularly for the early part of
1987. The earlier decline of the dollar had enhanced
the international competitiveness of many U.S. firms,
“The Committee approved a temporary increase from $6 billion to $7
billion in the limit on changes in System Account holdings ofgovern-
ment securities during the next intermeeting period, effective De-
cember 3. Outright purchases through December 1 had left insuffi-
cient leeway for additional purchases that would be necessary to
provide for seasonal increases in required reserves and currency in
circulation.
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but a number of members expected only minor im-
provement in foreign trade over the quarters ahead.
The growth of consumer debt was viewed as a factor
that might inhibit domestic demand in 1987. More-
over, consumers and businesses were thought to have
shifted some purchases originally planned for 1987
into 1986 to take advantage of certain pi-ovisions ofthe
tax code that were scheduled forrescission under the
new tax legislation.” While the reduction in personal
tax rates fom 1987 was good news for consumers, the
new tax code along with high vacancy rates had nega-
tive implications for spending on multifamily housing
and nonresidential construction.
In their discussion of policy implementation, the
members noted that thebroader monetary aggregates,
whose growth had slowed in November, were within
their target ranges fortheyear. Onthe othei hand, the
growth of Ml had accelerated in November. Some
members felt that a continuation of the rapid growth
of that aggregate. and the reserves needed to support
it, carried an inflationary risk. There was a strong
likelihood, however, that Ml velocity would continue
to decline even with some slowing in Ml growth. Once
again, the Committee agreed that the growth of Ml
would be appraised in the context ofthe growth of the
broader aggregates and other developments.
Given the economic outlook and the fact that M2
and M3 were within their long-mn ranges, the Com-
mittee directed the desk “to maintain the existing
degree of pressure on reserve positions.” In light of
the downside risks to the economy, several members
emphasized that in subsequent weeks, developments
might call forsome easing ofreserve conditions. ‘rhese
member-s noted that flexibility in the direction ofease
wasafforded by the recent firming of the dollar-s value.
Members recognized, however, that circumstances
might call for a small adjustment in either direction.
The Committee’s deemphasis of Ml as an interme-
diate target and guide for policy was underscored at
the December meeting. A tentative range of 3t o8
percent for Ml growth in 1987 had been reported to
Congress in Jul as more tentative than usual. In
December, amajority ofthe Committee indicated that
they opposed ‘establishing a formal target range for
Ml growth in 1987.” Many of those members believed,
however, that Ml growth “should continue to he mon-
itored or evaluated in light of information about the
economy, prices, and the broad monetary aggregates
and other financial variables.”
“See Tax Reform Act of 1985.
“Record (April1987), p. 304.
CONCLUSION
The FOMC deemphasized Ml and placed relatively
more weight on the broader monetary aggregates and
various economic and financial indicators in estab-
fishing its overall approach to policy and in guiding
short-run policy implementation during 1986. A state-
ment typical of the 1986 directives issued by the Com-
mittee was that changes in the direction of policy
implementation would depend ‘on the behavior of
the aggregates, taking into account the strength ofthe
business expansion, developments in foreign ex-
change markets, progress against inflation, and condi-
tions in domestic and international credit markets.”
The lengthy list offactors guiding policy underscored
the Committee’s desire to take a flexible approach in
providing reserves in what itviewed as ahighly uncer-
tain economic environment.
The recent changes in the relative weights attached
to various policy guides have reflected the Commit-
tee’s evaluation of the importance and reliability of
these variables in influencing real growth and in-
flation. The accommodative thrust ofpolicy was moti-
vated by sluggish economic growth and a number of
risks to sustained expansion. While the Committee
was wary of inflationary risks in the outlook, puce
pressures over the course of 1986 were well-
contained. Whether monetary policy can continue to
provide sufficient liquidity to sustain economic
growth without an acceleration in the i-ate of inflation
is a major issue confronting the Federal Reserve in
1987
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